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Michael Barr, Who's Afraid of China? The Challenge of Chinese Soft 
Power. London: Zed Books Ltd, 2011, 154 pp., ISBN 978-1-84813-590-1.
This is a short book about the fear of China's soft power in the West. It 
is well written and the analysis is easy to follow. The book is comprised 
of eight chapters. The ﬁrst chapter examines global reactions to the so-
called 'Beijing Consensus', a symbol of Chinese soft power, as a way 
to introduce the concept of soft power. Chapter 2 describes how the 
concept is understood within China and explains why China needs soft 
power. The author then uses the next ﬁve chapters to examine speciﬁc 
case studies of Chinese soft power in practice. Chapter 3 analyzes how 
the Chinese government uses media to promote its international image 
and reputation. Chapter 4 shows how Confucius, the founder of Con-
fucianism, is branded internationally by the government as a symbol 
of Chinese culture. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with Chinese political values 
such as 'harmonious world' and Tianxia ('all-under-heaven') philosophy. 
Chapter 7 addresses China's domestic and foreign policies on issues 
such as race, ethnicity and differences. Chapter 8 concludes the book 
by analyzing the root cause of the fear of China in general.
The book explains the limits of Chinese soft power. For example, 
the 'Beijing Consensus', a buzzword for the Chinese development 
model, the author argues, is neither a consensus nor unique to Beijing. 
According to the author, the basic tenets of the Chinese authoritarian 
capitalism model were established elsewhere in East Asia before Deng 
Xiaoping launched the reform and opening policy in 1978. In addition, 
domestically, the Chinese development model has been under attack 
for its serious drawbacks including endemic corruption, suppression 
of freedom of expression and growing income inequality. In fact, many 
scholars inside China have called for abandoning the so-called Chinese 
development model. 
In China, some scholars argue that culture is the most important 
source of soft power; the Chinese government supports this view and 
has recently attached strategic importance to promoting Chinese culture 
internationally. One of the government's efforts is the establishment of 
Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius Classrooms (CCs) worldwide. 
According to the ofﬁcial constitution and by-laws of the CIs, they are 
non-proﬁt public institutions designed to enhance international under-
standing of Chinese language and culture and to strengthen educational 
and cultural exchange between China and other countries. By the end 
of August 2011, China had established 353 CIs and 473 CCs globally. 
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Although most CIs have been set up smoothly and without protest, 
there are some cases of strong resistance and scepticism. For instance, 
some critics claim that the CIs are linked to Chinese intelligence services. 
Although no concrete evidence of espionage has been found, the scepti-
cism toward CIs is here to stay. One Swedish parliamentarian wondered 
how the Chinese government could justify to its own population why 
it was giving priority to subsidizing Western educational institutions 
when 'China has 10 million children without a proper school'. 
Such limits to Chinese soft power can also be found in other aspects 
discussed by the author; however, the West still fears Chinese soft power 
and China's rise in general. Why is this so? The author offers two easy-
to-identify reasons. The ﬁrst is deliberate exaggeration, namely, some 
politicians will deliberately exaggerate the danger of not taking action 
in order to boost the legitimacy of the actions they intend to take. It 
seems this is the case in the allegation of Confucius Institutes engaging 
in collecting intelligence. In this case, some people are calling for action 
to stop the establishment of Confucius Institutes in their countries. To 
legitimate their arguments, they tend to exaggerate the dangers, saying 
for example, that it will allow the CIs to collect intelligence inside their 
countries, which may be perceived as dangerous by some people who 
may then support the actions to be taken.
The second reason is the vehicle fallacy, namely, many China ob-
servers in the West tend to equate China's deployment of (soft power) 
resources with actually getting the desired result (of gaining soft power). 
This seems true in the case of China's media offensive. In recognition 
of the dominance of the West in world media, China has committed 
US$6.5 billion for the overseas expansion of its main media organiza-
tion including its Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Central Television, 
People's Daily and China Radio International. One key purpose of this 
media offensive is to improve China's international image. However, 
even if such image-building investments do pay off, other actions in 
China may immediately reduce such a payoff, e.g., when the West saw 
Chinese top leaders collectively mourn the death of Kim Jong Il.
In addition, the author argues that there is a deeply rooted psychologi-
cal factor that causes the fear of China, namely, a general perception of 
a loss of centrality and purpose in the West. This is especially true for 
those who are preoccupied with maintaining Western hegemony. In 
the author's view, China has succeeded in many ways in creating the 
perception at least of something better by combining the Western model 
with its own; in other words, China offers an alternative that is differ-
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ent from the Western one. Thus, the cause of much threat perception is 
not just founded on China inventing a new game but rather on China 
beating the West at its own game. That really unnerves many who are 
reluctant to do self-examination. In this sense, it may not matter much 
if China suddenly democratizes, because, even if it did, China would 
still be seen as a threat. In short, the fear of a rising China reﬂects the 
insecurity of the West. 
Overall, the book offers a critical and balanced analysis of China's 
soft power and international reaction to it. After reading this book, 
both proponents and opponents of the 'China threat theory' will have to 
rethink their one-sided arguments. China is much more complex than 
any oversimpliﬁed theory can describe and predict. The rise of China 
will be simultaneously an opportunity and a challenge to the West. To 
take advantage of the opportunities created by China's rise, China and 
the West need to cooperate. To deal with the challenge, the West needs 
a more open attitude to engage China on the one hand, and China needs 
to make more adjustments in accordance with international norms on 
the other. By reading this book, one will not become more informed 
to make predictions about the future relations between China and the 
West; however, as the author states clearly in the introductory chapter, 
that is not the aim of the book. The author was wise about the choice 
for two reasons. For one, China is in transition, albeit a slow one. It is 
difﬁcult to predict its trajectory. For another, the root cause of the fear 
of a rising China is the psychology of insecurity in the West that is dif-
ﬁcult to change in the short run. 
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